Bank failures and public policy by R. Alton Gilbert
BANK FAILURES since the fall of last year have
caused a great deal of concern regarding both the
soundness of banks and the effectiveness of current
regulatory practices in this countryJ The largest bank
failure in U.S. history occurred last year with the col-
lapse of the Franklin National Bank of New York
(total assets of $3.6 billion). One of the immediate
causes for the failure of Franklin National was large
loan losses in foreign exchange transactions. However,
Franklin National also had difficulty generating earn-
ings ratios as high as banks of comparable size which
were accepting the same risks.2 Fourteen other banks
have failed or were forced into mergers since last fall,
the largest being Security National Bank of Long
Island (total assets of $1.8 billion), which had large
losses in real estate loans. Information on those fail-
mores and forced mergers is presented in Table I.
The recent experience with bank failures differs
from what has occurred during most of the period
since the early 1940s, when the few banks that did
fail were primarily small banks.3 Deposits of banks
that failed during those years generally comprised
less than one-hundredth of one percent of total de-
posits (see Table II). The share of total deposits in
banks that failed has tended to be higher since the
mid-1960s, rising to roughly one quarter of one per-
cent in 1974. This changing pattern since the mid-
196Os reflects failures of larger banks.
A primary objective of hank regulation in this
country is prevention of hank failures, In addition,
mclix ition of somc honking regulitmons h ts been rec
ognizcd o’, -tnotim i dcsu oble pohc) goal In recent
it mrs some n gtmlotions base been relixed to give
b inks gte otes Iscedom to respond to chongong market
conditions. As regulations are relaxed, however, banks
Imave a tendency to assume greater risks and, hence,
increase their vulnerability to failure. The goal of








These tovo policy goals for banking can he made
more compatible by-altering the program for Federal
deposit insurance such that the premiums on deposit
insurance are based upon the risks banks assume. As
background to tlus proposed change, the causes of
ss’idespread bank failures are discussed, with refer-
ence to the experience of the lf,30s. and the regula-
tory response to dealing with the vulnerability of the
banking system to such failures is described. In addi-




What is a Bank Failure?
Banks are officially declared failures, by the state
or Federal agencies that charter them, svhen the net
worth of a bank becomes zero or negative, or when a
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For a discussion of public concern over the soundness of
haoks, see Business Week, April 21, 1975, and Forbes, July
1, 1975. Ooe indication of the concern of investors about the
soundness of banks is the rapid decline in bank stock prices
front spring to fall of 197-4. Investors got news of the financial
difficulties of Franklin National iso May of last year. An index
of stock prices of New York City Banks fell at a 63.5 percent
annual rate from April to September of 1974, compared to a
52.0 percent rate of decrease in the Standard -and Poor’s
stock index during the same period. The index of basok stock
prices arid the Standard and Poor’s 500 composite stock index
are presented in an accompanying chart.
2Sassfesrd Rose. “What Really Went Wrong at Franklin Na-
tional’, Fortune (October 1974), pp. 118-21, 220-27.
5
Note that time chart entitled “Bank Failures 1934-7-4” and
Table II refer to only those banks that have bees) declared
failures by their government supervisors and (10 root inelesde
those forced to merge with larger banks disc to financial diffi-
culties even though technically solvent. This distiuetioss ac-
counts for the differences between the observations iso Table I
and those in Table II and the “Bank Failesres” chart.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS NOVEMBER 1975
situation threatens to make the
Table net worth of a bank zero or neg-
Banks That Failed or Were Forced to Merge With alive. Such situations have one
larger Banks Since September 1974 of the following three outcomess
Total Deposits Total Assets (1) The chartering agency
millions (millions
Name and Location of Sank Disposition of Bank of dallas) of dollars) closes a bank pennanently. De-
. . positors receive payment from
American Bank and Trust Depos’t liabilities assumed $127.2 $145.3
Orangeburg, South Carolina by Southern Bank and Trust, (June 1974) (june 19741 the Federal Deposst Insurance
Greenville. South Carolina, Corporation (FDIC) for up to
on September 20, 1974.
$40,000 per deposit account.
Tri.City Sank Deposit liabilities assumed Si 6.4 $18.3
Warren, Michigan by Michigan National Bank, (June 1Q74) (June 1974) Customers with deposits over
Warren, Michigan. on 9/27/74. •S40,000 lose the uninsured por~
Cromwell State Savings Banks Dopas.t liabilities assumed by $3.3 $to tions of their accounts, unless
Cromwell, Iowa own StatosovinysBank, ~reston, (June 1974) (June 1974) there is some residual value
when the FDIC disposes of the
Franklin National Bank Deposit liabilities assumed $1,577.7 $3,590.6
New York City, New Yo’k by European.American Bank (June 1974) (June 1974) banks assets.
and Trust Company, New Yo’k City,
New York, on October B, 1974. (2) The chartering agency
Swape Parkway National Bank EDIC appointed receiver at $9.2 $9.7 closes a bank, but its deposit
Kansas City, Missouri bank. Insured deposit (June 1974) (June 1974) liabilities and assets are assumed
liabilities assumed by
Deposit Insurance National by another bank. In some cases,
Bank of Kansas City under the FDIC either purchases as-
Section II af the FDI Act,
January 3, 1975. sets of a faihng bank which are
Security National Sank Merged with Chemical Bank $1,432.0 $1,771.3 of questionable value or insures
Lang Island, New York in January 1975 because a! (June 1 97~l (June 1974) the bank that is assuming the
pressure from supervisory deposit liabilities from losses on
Narthern Ohio Bank Deposit liabilities assumed $85.6 $104.4 the assets it acquires. No cus-
Cleveland, Ohio by National City Bank, (June 1974) (June 1974) tomers incur losses on their de-
Cleveland, 0hio,on posit accounts in this case. The
banking organization which as-
Franklin Bank Closed by supervisory $24.0 $29.8
Houston, Texas authorities an March 24, 1975 (June 1974) (June 1974) sumes deposit habshoties often
and the FDIC named receiver, begins offering banking services
Chicopee Bank & Trust Co. Closed May 9,1975. Deposit $11.7 $13.1 at the offices of the bank that
Chicapee, Massachusetts liabilities assumed by the (June 1974) (June 1Q74) r ~1 .1 4
Hatyake National Bank. as~e~.
Algoma Bank Clased May 30, 1975. Deposit $6.1 $7.0 (3) ‘Without officially declar—
Algama. Wisconsin tiablities to be assumed by (Juno 1974) (June 1974) .-
the First State Bank of Algama, mg a bank to have failed, reg-
anew bank which will be ulatory authorities arrange an
affiliated with the First
National Bank of Sturgeon Bay emergency merger between a
Bank of Picayune Closed on June 19, 1975 due $14.9 $17.3 bank having financial difficulties
Picayune, Mississippi ta embezzlement by an officer. (June 1974) (June 1974) and another bank. The merged
Deposit liabilities assumed
by Hancock Bank, Gulfport. batik assumes all of the deposit
Mississippi. liabilities of the bank having
Sankof Chidester Closed July 1,1975. Deposit $20 $2.2 financial difficulties.
Chidester, Arkansas liabitites assumed by (Decentber (December
Merchants and Planters Bank, 1974) 1974) - .-
Camden, Arkansas. 51’ s’sim 1934 (the begmrsmg of Federal deposit Insurance) through 1973, 297
State Bank of Clearing Closed July 12, 1Q75. Deposit $62.5 $81 3 insured banks were closed soerma-
Chicago. Illinois liabilities assumed by (December (December ssently for hquidation, and the de-
Clearing Bank, anew bank 1914) 1974) posit liabilities of 205 failing banks
Astro Bank Ctased October 16, 1975 $6.9 $7.9 were assumed by other financial in-
Houston, Texas Depositliabilities assumed (December (December stitutsoas. Through 1973 the deQosits
by Commonwealth Bank of 1974) 1974) of insured banks that have failed less
Houston, a new bank, payment to the depositors of those banks amounted to about $25.3 mil-
American City National Bank Closed October 21, 1975. $1466 $1 88.2 lion. flowever, some of that amount
and Trust Company Deposit liabilities assumed (December (December will ultimately he recovered as the
Milwaukee, Wisconsin by Marine National Exchange 1974) 1974) assets of closed banks are liquidated.
Bank of Milwaukee. Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, Annual Report (1973), p. 5.
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Table II
Incidence of Bank Failure:
Deposits of Banks That Failed
Deposits af
Commercial Deposits a! Depasits at
Banks Foiling Banks Failing Banks as
(In Billion (In Thousands a Percentage of
Yew , of $j’ of $1 , Total Depos,ti
1934 $29.90 5373)2 0.1249~-
1935 34.48 19987 0.0580
1936 38.44 28100 0.0731
1937 40.05 34205 0.0854
1938 40.07 60722 0.1515
1939 43.43 160211 0.3689
1940 48.72 142787 0.2931
1941 54.37 29797 0.0548
1942 60.23 19541 0.0324
1943 74.40 12525 0.0168
1944 86.26 1915 0.0022
1945 102.04 5695 0.0056
1946 112.62 494 0.0004
1947 119.4 7207 0.0060
1948 122.0 10674 0.0087
1949 122.0 9217 0.0076
1950 125.8 5555 0.0044
1951 130.9 6464 0.0049
1952 138.2 3313 0.0024
1953 143.5 45101 0.0314
1954 149.7 2948 0.0020
1955 156.1 11953 0.0077
1936 159.0 11690 0.0074
1957 163.6 12502 0.0076
1958 172.8 10413 0.0060
1959 181.6 2593 0.0014
1960 183.6 7965 0.0043
1961 195.9 10611 0.0054
1962 210.7 4231 0.0020
1963 228.1 23444 0.0103
1964 246.2 23867 0.0097
1963 269.5 45256 0.0168
1966 291.2 106171 0.0365
1967 315.6 10878 0.0034
1968 344.8 22524 0.0065
1969 360.4 40133 0.0111
1970 376.2 52826 0.0140
1971 433.7 132032 0.0304
1972 484.3 99786 0.0206
1973 349.6 971312 0.1767
1974 611.1 15712082 0.2371
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Although the stock market crash came in October
1929, the large rise in the rate of bank failures did not
occur until October 1930,6 The failure of several
banks in the fall of 1930 created fear that other banks
were unsound,7 Depositors began demanding con-
version of their deposit balances to currency on a
large scale.
Even a conservatively managed bank has limited
ability to convert deposits to currency for a large
fraction of its depositors. A bank generally cannot use
its required reserves for such payments of currency
since bank regulatory authorities regard these re-
serves as essential for a bank’s continued operation.
One source of currency for making payments to de-
positors is from selling assets. When many banks
simultaneously experience large currencywithdrawals,
attempts of banks to obtain currency by selling se-
cusities will tend to drive down the prices of securi-
ties. Tf these \runs continue long enough and the
market values of securities fall far enough, even the
most conservatively managed banks will tend to be-
come insolvent as they suffer losses in liquidating
their assets,
This process of several bank failures inducing fear
of more failures, bank runs, declines in the value of
bank assets, and then additional bank failures, oc-
curred in three phases in the early 1930s. The last
phase of this process came in the first three months
of 1933~
6As one indication that the public retained its confidence in
commercial banks until the fall of 1930, the ratio of bank
deposits to currency rose during the period August 1929 to
October 1930.
~ThicJ,pp. 308-309.
~Ibid, pp. 308-332. Widespread bank failures were not in-
evitable in the early 1930s when fear of insolvency of banks
spread among bank customers. In the banking crisis of 1907
and in earlier banking crises, banks mutually agreed not to
convert deposit balances to currency for their customers.
During such periods, the public continued to use bank depos-
its as money, and banks continued to offer most services, but
for a while deposits could not be converted into currency.
See Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History, pp.
156-68. One of the reasons for establishing the Federal
Reserve System was to make such restrictions of conversion
from deposits to currency unnecessary since the Federal
Reserve was to provide sufficient currency to banks when-
ever there was a threat of large deposit withdrawals. The
existence of the Federal Reserve as lender of last resort may
have been a major reason why commercial banks did not
mutually agree to restrict payments of currency in the early
1930s. However, the Federal Reserve failed to function in its
role as lender of last resort during that period. There were
some expansionary policy actions by the Federal Reserve
immediately after the stock market crash in 1929 and again
in 1932, but these actions were not sufficient to offset the
forces tending to reduce the nsoney stock and bank credit.
See Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History, pp. 305-6,
pp. 322-4.
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One important point to be emphasized from the
process that generates widespread hank failures is
that when the public loses confidence in the banking
industry, forces which cause an individual bank to fail
are, in general, independent of its prior investment
policies. Both a bank that has invested in risky assets
and one that has assumed little risk are vulnerable to
failure in such an environment. Therefore, policies
designed to deal effectively with widespread bank
failures must involve more than simply requiring
banks to acquire less risky assets.
Bank Regulatory Response to Widespread
Fa-ilures
The following discussion describes features of the
bank regulatory policies which have been developed
since the early l930s that deal with the vulnerability
of the banking system to widespread failures. Indi-
vidual features of the regulatory policies are evalu-
ated in other studies; such an evaluation is not the
purpose of this paper.°Presentation of bank regula-
tory policies as an interrelated system designed to
prevent bank failures facilitates the analysis below of
how proposals for financial reform would influence
bank behavior and vulnerability to failure.
The most significant innovation in bank regulation
during the 1930s was Federal deposit insurance, of-
‘Gcorge I. Benstori, “Imstcrcst Payments on Demand Deposits
arid Bank Investment Behavior,” Journal of Political Economy
(October 1964), pp. 431-49; Benston and John 1’. Marlin,
“Bank Examiners’ Evaluation of Credit: An Analysis of the
Usefulness of Substandard Loan Data,” Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking (February 1974), pp. 23-44; Sam Peltz-
muass, “Entry in Commercial Banking,” Journal of Law and
Economics (October 1965), pp. 11-50; Peltzman, “Capital
investment in Commercial Banking and Its Relationship to
Portfolio Regulation,” Journal of Political Economy (January/
February 1970), pp. 1-26; Donald P. Jacobs, The Impact of
Examination Practices Upon Commercial Bank Lending
Policies, Staff Assalysis for House Committee on Bamsking and
Currency, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C.,
G.P.O., 1964; Lucille S. Mayne, “Supervisory Influence on
Bank Capital,” Journal of Finance (June 1972), pp. 637-51;
I-Isiu-Kwang-Wu, “Bank Examiner Criticisms, Barsk Loan De-
faults, and Bank Loan Quality,” Journal of Finance (Septem-
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fered through the FDIC. Federal deposit insurance
reduces the incentives for bank runs when some
events occur which, in the period before deposit in-
surance, would have made depositors fearful about
the safety of their deposits.
Although deposit insurance has been effective in
preventing bank runs, prevention of individual fail-
ures is also a national policy objective. One important
reason for attempting to keep bank failures at a low
rate is to keep the payouts from the deposit insurance
fund low, thus promoting public confidence in the
ability of the deposit insurance fund to meet its
obligations. The risks that banks assume must be con-
strained in some way in order to have a low rate of
bank failure. The Federal deposit insurance program
is not designed to constrain the incentives for banks
to assume risks since the premium rate for deposit
insurance does not vary among banks but is a given
percentage of insured deposits. Since Federal deposit
insurance provides a large degree of safety from bank
runs, it may tend to induce banks to hold portfolios
of assets with higher risks than if the banking system
was less safe from bank runs.
The risks that banks assume are constrained by
direct government regulation of hank behavior. A
limit is imposed on the maximum loan that each bank
can make to one customer which, by regulation, is a
fraction of the hank’s capital. This regulation may
cause banks to diversify their risks to a greater extent
than they otherwise would. Banks are restricted from
buying corporate stock, and there are some restric-
tions on the real estate loans that banks can make.
Regulators examine banks to determine the quality of
their assets and to enforce compliance with all regula-
tions. As part of the examination process, examiners
rate the quality of bank management, and occa-
sionally exert pressure to change management. Regu-
lators put pressure on banks to keep their capital-to-
asset ratios above minimum levels.10 All of these
forms of regulation tend to impose the judgment of
regulators on banks, reducing the ability of banks to
respond to changing market conditions in investing
their assets.
In addition, regulation of bank liabilities involves
ceilings on interest rates that banks may pay on time
deposits and prohibition of interest on demand de-
posits. An intent of these regulations is to increase
hank profits, to remove the incentives for banks to
acquire high risk assets,. and to decrease the volatility
of deposits.11 One important influence of this regula-
tion is that levels of interest ceilings in relation to
snarket rates influence the ability of banks to attract
time deposits.
lOi’he penalties that bank regulators have for enforcing their
capital adequacy standards include removal of hank officers
and directors, cancellation of deposit insurance, and closing
banks. These penalties are quite drastic and are seldom
imposed. i’here is sonic evidence that bank regulators
have little effect on the capital ratios of banks. See Sam
Peltzmari, “Capital Investment in Commercial Banking and
Its Relationship to Portfolio Regulation,” Journal of Political
Economy (January/Febnmary 1970), pp. 1-26; Lucille S.
Mayne, “Ss,perviso,y Influence on Bank Capital,” Journal
of Finance (June 1972), pp. 637-51,
“George Benston tested the hypothesis that banks which paid
higher interest rates on deposits made more risky loans.
The ressslts of empirical tests led him to reject that hypothe-
sis. See George J. Benston, “Interest Payments on Demand
Deposits and Bank Investment Behavior,” Journal of Politi-
cal Economy (October 1964), pp. 431-49.
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Effects of Bank Beg-ulat-io-n o-n Fail-u-res
The bank regulatory scheme developed in the
l930s contributed to a reduction in the rate of bank
failure to relatively low levels by the early 194Os. No
more than 9 banks failed in any one year from 1943
through 1974, compared with approximately 500 fail-
ures per year in the 1920s (see accompanying
chart) 12 There has been no tendency for bank fail-
ures to cause loss of confidence in banks in general
and to induce additional failures. The sort of failures
that have occurred since the early 1940s have often
created public benefits since failure is one process of
removing inefficient or dishonest bankers.
Recent Develop-meats in Ba-ak Reg-ulation,
Behav-io-r. and. I-m-plications for Failu-res
Since the early 1940s, bank failures have been
caused primarily by embezzlement, fraud, bad man-
agement, and assumption of high risks~This section
focuses on the risk aspect of bank failures. Several
developments in recent years have reduced regula-
tory constraints on banks without changing incentives
for banks to accept risks, and many banks have re-
sponded by accepting higher risks. The following
discussion includes only a few of the important
changes in regulation and bank behavior which have
been taking place.
Liability Management — During the 1960s, impor-
tant changes took place in the sources of bank funds.
Some banks began attracting a large share of their
deposit liabilities by issuing certificates of deposit,
and the volume of transactions in Federal funds was
greatly expanded, as shown in the accompanying
chart. Banks were given greater freedom to attract
funds by issuing large CDs in 1970 when interest
ceilings were removed on short-term time deposits of
$100,000 or more and in 1973 when interest ceilings
were removed on large time deposits of all maturities,
Another source of funds that banks began to use dur-
i
2
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Annual Report,
1934, pp. 93-94.
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ing the late 1960s was that of bank related commer-
cial paper, which is sold by subsidiaries of banks or
bank holding companies (see chart).
Banks which attract large shares of their funds
from sources that are not fully insured are vulnerable
to losing such funds quickly if investors discover that
those banks are having financial difficulties.14 There-
fore, many banks have become more vulnerable to
liquidity crises due to their practices of attracting
large shares of their funds for investment by issuing




n Regu’atzons Affecting Bank Assets and
Capital —~Important changes have also been made in
the regulation of assets that banks may acquire and
in the capital structure of banks. Many of these
changes have been snitnted by the Comptroller of the
Currency, and simil’u iegulations hive been ‘-idopted
by the other b”tnk regulatory agencies Several such
chinges discussed in the 1963 Annual Report of the
Comptroller are listed below
(1) Lending limits the largest loan binks can make
to ins one customer were increased for many banks
(2) Nitional banks were given gie’iter freedom in
m il-ang reil estate loins
(3) The types of general obligation bonds of state
and local governments that national banks could
underwrite were expanded.
(4) National banks were allowed to count long-
term debt which is subordinated to deposit liabilities
as part of their capital.35 In cases of bank liquidation,
holders of subordinated debt receive payment only if
all depositors receive full payment. Previously, bank
regulators considered only equity capital to be hank
capital.
The first three changes listed above influence the
riskiness of assets that banks may acquire. Regula-
tions concerning debt as bank capital also have sev-
eral important implications for the risk exposure of
banks. Suppose that for some reason a bank has a
large reduction in the value of its’ assets. The feasi-
bility of the hank accumulating enough capital out of
retained earnings to again be considered a viable or-
“The CDs issued by n3ost banks are insured by the FDIC
up to $10,000 per depositor. Federal funds borrowings are
not insured by the FDIC.
“The Federal Reserve and the FDIC recently proposed
changes in regulations which would specify the role of debt
as capital for banks regulated by those agencies.
“For a discussion of the causes for individual bank failures
each year, see the Anrsrral Reports of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, For an additional discussion of the
reasons for bank failssres, see Recent Bank Closings, Hear-
logs before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House
of Represerstatives, March 9, 1971, pp. 33-37; Robert F.
Barnett, “Anatomy of a Bank Failure,” The Magazine of
Bank Adnsinistration (April 1972), pp. 20-23, 43; George J.
Benston, Bank Examination (New York University, The
BulletIn, No. 89-90, May 1973); and John J. Slocum, “Why
57 Insured Banks Did Not Make it— 1960 to 1972,” Jour-
nal of Commercial Bank Lending (August 1973), pp 44-56.
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Sources of Funds for Banks Engaged in Liability Management
ganization by regulators could depend upon how
much debt the bank has in its capital structure. In-
terest payments on debt capital and its ultimate
retirement are obligations that the bank must meet in
order to remain solvent, whereas dividend payments
can he postponed, and there is no obligation to retire
equity capital. Another implication of regulators con-
sidering long-term debt to be bank capital is that
banks can increase their lending limits by issuing
such debt, since lending limits are based upon the
total capital accounts of banks.
Acquisision~sof Nonbank-ing Finn-,s by BI-ICs — An-
other recent development which has implications for
the risks of bank failures is the acquisition of non-
banking firms by bank holding companies (BHCs).
Since 1970 the Federal Reserve Board has had the
responsibility of determining the activities in which
BHCs may engage.ie Table III lists the currently
approved activities. The expansion of BHCs into non-
banking industries creates possibilities for financial
difficulties of nonbanking subsidiaries to adversely
affect hank subsidiaries. Many customers of a sub-
sidiary bank may withdraw their deposits if a non-
bank subsidiary of the BHC experiences financial
difficulties. One reason for depositors of a subsidiary
bank to start a run on the bank is they may assume
5
’In 1956 the Federal Reserve Board received legislative
authority to regulate the acquisitions of finns that own
controlling interest in two or more banks. These holding
companies were not allowed to engage in activities other
than banking. FIolding companies owning only one bank
were free to make whatever acquisitions of nonbanking
firms they wanted before 1970. The BHC Act of 1970 gives
the Federal Rescue Board authority to regulate the acquisi-
tion of all BHCs with the possibility of BHCs acquiring
firms in industries other than banking which the Board rules
to be closely related to banking. BHCs must get prior
approval from the Board for each such acquisition.
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Page 13that the subsidiary bank has made the same bad in-
vestment decisions as the nonbank subsidiary. An-
other reason depositors may react in that way is
because they may assume that the subsidiary bank
will use its resources to help the nonbank subsidiary
in financial difficulty, even though several regulations
restrain subsidiary banks from taking -such actions.
The possible risks to banks of affiliation with a BHC
are illustrated in the case of the Beverly Hills Na-
tional Bank and its parent corporation. The BHC had
financed large loans to a real estate developer by
selling its own commercial paper. When the real es-
tate developments became unprofitable, the BHC had
difficulty refinancing its commercial paper debt. The
bank lost deposits as the financial position of the BHC
became more widely known, although the bank itself
was solvent according to the analysis of the Comp-
troller of the Currency. The holding company sold its
interest in the hank to the WelLs Fargo Bank to pay
off its debts.mr
Other Causes of- Recent Bank Failures — It is diffi-
cult to determine the role of the above changes in
regulations and bank behavior in the recent bank
failures because there have been several other forces
at work, The recent recession began in the fall of
1973, and it is during recession periods that large loan
losses make some banks insolvent. Historical evidence
in the accompanying chart indicates a tendency for
bank failures to rise when the rate of economic activ-
ity declines. In addition, the risks of speculation in
foreign exchange have been greater since 1971 when
17
American Banker, January 2 and 23, 1974.
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the world monetary system was switched from fixed
to floating exchange rates. The failure of Franklin
National provides an example of the influence that
foreign exchange speculation can have on bank earn-
ings and capital.
Some Recent Proposals for Further Relaxation
of Co-nstraints on Bank Behavior
Proposals for financial reform which have received
much attention in the past few years may indicate
the future course of bank regulation. Proposals for
financial reform by the Hunt Commission call for re-
laxation of several banking regulations which affect
various types of activities in which banks may engage
and the types of assets they may acquire.tm8 The
Financial Institutions Act of 1975 proposes similar re-
laxation of regulations on real estate loans and com-
munity development projects.
Neither group of proposals for financial reform
would alter the way in which deposit insurance pre-
miums are calculated. Therefore, these proposals, like
several changes in regulation in recent years, would
move the banking system in the direction of fewer
constraints without reducing the incentives of banks
to accept high risks; the degree to which such pro-
posals would affect bank safety is uncertain.
RECONCILING BANK SAFETY WITH
RELAXATION OF REGULATiONS
Bank regulation has changed in recent years to
give banks greater freedom in attracting funds and
selecting assets, and proposals currently under con-
sideration indicate that there may be fewer regulatory
constraints on banks in the future. However, if a low
rate of hank failure and a solvent deposit insurance
fund also continue to be important objectives of public
policy, new forms of bank regulation must be imple-
mented to restrain the risks that some banks would be
induced to assume.
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Nonbanking Activities in Which Bank








Loan Servci n g
Trust Company
tnvostment or Financial Advise’
Leasing Real or Personal Property
Mok.-g Equity and Debt Investments in Ca’ poratons or Proiects
Desspned Prima’i!y to Promote Community Wol’are
Bookkeeping or Do’a Processing Services
Insurance Agent or Broker
Underwriter at Credit lnsLrarce
Courier Services
Managemert Conct.lting Advice to Banks not AfPI’a’ed wi•h tho
Bank Holding Company
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See The Report of the President’s Commission on Financial
Structure and Regulation (Washington, D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 41-43. The Hunt
Commission proposed, among other things, that (I) corn—
risercial banks and their subsidiaries he permitted to engage
in a variety of nonbanking activities of the type approved
for BUGs by the Federal Reserve Board; (2) special
statutory and regulatory restrictions on real estate loans be
abolished; (3) commercial banks he permitted to invest in
any assets sip to 3 percent of total assets or 30 percent of
capital, surplus, amid undivided profits, whichever is less;
(4 1 authority to underwrite reversue bonds he expanded;
5) eOismnsercial banks be permitted to make equity invest—
merits in coniniunity rehabilitation amid development corpora-
tions in amounts up to 5 percent of capital, surplus, arid
undivided profits.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS NOVEMBER 1975
These objectives could be achieved through a pro-
gram of charging banks deposit insurance premiums
based upon the risks they assume.’° Regulation of
bank behavior could be eliminated. Individual banks
would be free to choose the degrees of risk they
prefer. Most banks would probably not accept high
risks if deposit insurance premiums were set high
enough to compensate the deposit insurance fund for
the risks involved, Whatever would be the choices of
banks in accepting risks, the most important consid-
eration is that public confidence in the capacity of
the deposit insurance fund to meet its obligations pre-
vents bank runs, and under this plan the solvency of
the insurance fund would be protected by charging
banks premiums that are high enough to cover their
risks of failure.
The Hunt Commission Report presents the com-
mon arguments against variable deposit insurance
premiums in tise following quote:
The Commission rejected the variable rate proposal.
It recognizes that differences in risk of failure exist
and that its recommendation for liberalizing the
regulations relating to the asset, liability and capital
structures of financial institutions would probably
increase these differences. The problem is a prac-
tical one. The Commission does not see how differ-
ences in risks can be evaluated with sufficient
precision to be adequately reflected in insurance
assessments. Further, the Commission believes that
assessments might be used, albeit unintentionally, to
penalize innovative institutions. New and different
functions might be regarded as high risk functions.
Finally, knowledge that some institutions were pay-
ing higher assessments than others could weaken
public confidence in those institutions, which would
defeat the purpose insurance was designed to
achieve.
20
Sam Peltzman has answers for these arguments.21
The evaluation of assets by bank examiners could be
used as the basis for setting deposit insurance pre-
miums, As to the argument that innovative institutions
would be penalized with higher insurance premiums,
Peltzman maintains that such penalties would be only
temporary until the insurance agency would adjust
the premiums to actual experience. Peltzman also
argues that with information on deposit insurance pre-
miums becoming public knowledge, banks would
have strong incentives to cater to the degree of risk
aversion desired by their depositors.
SUMMARY
An appropriate objective of public policy regarding
bank regulation is prevention of widespread bank
failures. The money stock and tank credit have de-
clined during past periods of widespread bank fail-
ures, disrupting economic activity. In the past, large
numbers of banks have failed when some events, such
as the failure of several banks or one large bank, made
depositors fearful about the soundness of all banks,
inducing them to demand currency for their deposits.
That response tended to make even more people
fearful about the soundness of their banks, creating
runs on banks.
In this country the most recent experience with
widespread bank failures was in the period 1930-33,
Current regulatory policies were largely developed in
the 1930s in response to that experience. A central
feature of these policies is Federal deposit insurance,
which has greatly reduced the risks of bank runs.
The deposit insurance premiums of banks are calcu-
lated as a given percentage of insured deposits. The
risks that insured banks assume are controlled by
direct regulation of bank behavior.
In recent years there has been some relaxation of
bank regulation, giving banks greater freedom to com-
pete in attracting deposits and investing their assets.
However, there have been no changes in regulatory
policies which would induce banks to restrain the risks
they assume. If it is in the public interest to relax
direct regulation of the risks that banks may assume
and yet keep the bank failure rate low and the de-
posit insurance fund solvent, one appropriate change
in policy would he to begin charging each bank a de-
posit insurance premium based upon the risks that it
assumes. Such a policy would give banks greater free-
dom to respond to market forces in investing their
assets while reducing their incentives to assume high
risks. The premiums would be set high enough to
compensate the insurance fund for the risks of failure
that banks assume.
i “For other discussions of this proposal, see Thomas Mayer,
“A Graduated Deposit Insurance Plan,” Review of Economics
and Statistics (February 1965), pp. 114-116; Clifton H.
Kreps, Jr. arsd Richard F. Waeht, “A More Constructive
Role for Deposit Insurance,” Jourmsal of Finarsce (May
1971), pp. 605-13; Sam Peltzman, “The Costs of Competi-
tion: An Appraisal of the Hunt Commission Report,” Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking (November 1972), pp. 1001-
4; Ronald D. Watson, “Insuring Some Progress in the Bank
Capital Hassle,” Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia (July-August 1974), pp. 3-18.
1opresident’s Commission on Financial Structure and Regula-
tion, p. 74.
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Sam Peltzmnan, “The Cost of Competition: An Appraisal of
the JImmt Commission Report,” Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking (November 1972), pp. 1001-4.
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